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Introduction: Cognitivism and Film Theory 
Edward S. Small 
This supplement is designed as an introduction to a movement which I 
believe is not yet well-known to scholars in either theatre or film. I myself 
first heard the term "cognitivism" less than three years ago. For me it is still 
in the process of definition. Each time I set about researching and writing 
something on cognitivism, I find that I learn a great deal more about the 
subject and, as a result, wind up refashioning my previous definitions. I do not 
expect that this process will greatly diminish; in fact, I expect it will greatly 
increase. Extant publications-books and articles-which fall under the aegis 
of "cognitive science" constitute a bibliography which is already vast and 
(perhaps monthly) grows vaster. Much of it deals with matters that have 
commanded my academic curiosity and concern for many years: issues of 
mentation and perception coupled with such philosophic mainstays as 
epistemological and ontological questions. Thus I have the feeling that 
cognitivism will continue to influence my scholarship and my teaching, at least 
throughout this current capstone decade. 
This is not to say that I presently call myself a "cognitivist." As a film 
theorist, I have spent the past several years studying Derrida's deconstruction 
and, when asked about disciplinary specializations, tend to characterize myself 
as a film/video semiotician (devoted to the continental school of Ferdinand de 
Saussure). Yet the following papers will show that the flourish and fashion 
enjoyed by, first, semiotics and structuralism, and later by postmodern analytic 
strategies are often implicitly countered by cognitive science. Still, such 
countering seems somehow refreshing. Cognitivism carries a remarkable sense 
of promise (and promises a remarkable sense of controversy) that should 
energize film theory and film theorists in the years ahead. Today we already 
witness a new, worldwide interest in how-the-human-mind-works which 
provides a wonderful pooling of resources. Today a common interest in how 
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we see and think connects perceptual and cognitive psychologies, neurophysiol-
ogy, linguistics, artificial intelligence, cultural anthropology, and other 
previously diverse disciplines. Cognitivists come from many disciplines and 
their concerns seem intrinsically interdisciplinary. Further, the discipline of 
classic film theory often prefigured cognitive concerns. 
As early as 1916, the pioneer film theorist Hugo Munsterberg stated the 
thesis of his "little book" as: 
first, an insight into the means by which the moving pictures impress 
us and appeal to us. Not the physical means and technical devices 
are in question, but the mental means. What psychological factors 
are involved when we watch the happenings on the screen?1 
Later, Arnheim's 1933 Film als Kunst reflected the gestalt theory of his 
"teachers Max Wertheimer and Wolfgang Kohler."2 Such theories are greatly 
removed from Freudian fashion. Instead, they are pointed toward more 
pragmatic empirical foundations-transcultural psychologies which inform 
cognitivism's current resources and which could reciprocally explain both the 
human sensorium cum mind as well as film and video's powerful yet still 
mysterious functions. 
While overlaps exist, film theory is not the same as film criticism. Film 
criticism's main concerns are the explication and evaluation of specific works. 
In contrast, film theory employs a diverse host of works to identify and 
elaborate general principles, "to formulate," in Dudley Andrew's words, "a 
schematic notion of the capacity of film."3 Often such formulations are 
inextricably interwoven with matters of human mentation. Consider 
Eisenstein's concerns with mental imagery, Bazin's employ of film to readdress 
classic philosophic concerns with ontology, or Kracauer's remarkably 
behaviorist epistemological premises. Then compare this tradition of film 
theory with Byrne and Keane's "Introduction to Cognitive Science." 
Cognitive science is the name of a relatively new approach to 
understanding an old problem: the nature of the mind and mental 
activities. For some time, researchers in many disciplines-cognitive 
psychology, artificial intelligence, philosophy, linguistics, and 
neurosciences—have attempted to understand aspects of human 
cognition. Under the banner of cognitive science, they are exploring 
the possibility that several heads may indeed be better than one for 
solving difficult problems. 
Cognitive scientists study many different aspects of the mind, 
for example, they study how we perceive the world and acquire 
knowledge. They examine how such knowledge is structured and 
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represented in memory, and how we reconstruct and retrieve 
information about our past experiences. They study how we use this 
knowledge in our thinking, reasoning and problem-solving. Their 
research is also directed towards our unique human abilities (e.g., 
language comprehension and production) and towards the limits of 
our abilities (e.g., our restricted working memories). Finally, in 
marked contrast to the earlier behaviorist program, they have 
directed increasing attention towards our conscious awareness of the 
world and our own thoughts.4 
Cognitive science makes this an exciting time in the historical 
development of film theory. After Kracauer, the theoretical study of how a 
film communicates and how it comes to mean experienced major changes. It 
went from a linguistic model to a political model built upon a linguistic model, 
to cognitivism's promise of a model based upon perception and cognition. But 
the historical development of cognitive science was quite independent of film 
theory. 
Howard Gardner's The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive 
Revolution sees major roots of cognitivism in Norbert Wiener's cybernetics and 
Claude Shannon's information theory.5 Indeed, Gardner's "consensual 
birthdate" for cognitivism is September 11, 1956-the day Noam Chomsky 
presented a paper, "Three Models of Language," at a Symposium on 
Information Theory held at MIT.6 "In short order the journal Cognitive 
Science was founded-its first issue appearing in January 1977; and soon 
thereafter, in 1979, a society of the same name was founded."7 
Gardner's own definition of cognitivism helps differentiate it not only 
from post-modern film theory but from theories of communication in more 
familiar academic disciplines. "I define cognitive science as a contemporary, 
empirically based effort to answer long-standing epistemological 
questions-particularly those concerned with the nature of knowledge, its 
components, its sources, its development, and its deployment."8 To the extent 
that film theory would employ cognitivism, then, it would have to prioritize an 
empirical epistemology and make that epistemological enterprise the ultimate 
goal of its research. Again, this is not really new to film theory's history. To 
paraphrase Christian Metz, whereas the film/video critic wants to understand 
a given work, the theoretician wants to understand that understanding. While, 
for critics, a given methodology is a means to an hermeneutic and/or 
evaluative end, a cognitivist film theory rather employs a given work as the 
means to answer larger (and really quite ancient) problems of human 
mentation and perception. And, always, the endeavor must remain open to 
scientific corroboration or rejection. 
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Gardner also cites interdisciplinarity as a key characteristic of 
contemporary cognitivism. This, however, is not an open set of disciplines; 
nor, for Gardner, is such a manifold clearly intrinsic. 
[CJognitive scientists harbor the faith that much is to be gained from 
interdisciplinary studies. At present most cognitive scientists are 
drawn from the ranks of specific disciplines—in particular, 
philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthro-
pology, and neuroscience (I shall refer to these disciplines severally 
as the 'cognitive sciences'). The hope is that some day the 
boundaries between these disciplines may become attenuated or 
perhaps disappear altogether, yielding a single, unified cognitive 
science.9 
Film theory's use of cognitivism, then, seems to be more likely derivative than 
contributory. However, I personally believe and bet that film/video research 
has a great deal to offer its cognitive host. For example, cognitivism does not 
seem to seek or need distinction between actual objects and photographic 
(cum cinematographic/videographic) surrogates of those objects. Film theory 
is wealthy in its examination and elaboration of those distinctions, and I think 
the cognitivist pantheon could profit from such contribution. 
Gardner also presents the computer as an especially precious part of the 
cognitive enterprise. Indeed, the development of the computer has been 
remarkably concomitant to the development of cognitivism. Steven Pinker 
draws upon Gardner in his address of this point: 
Over the past 25 years, the field called 'Cognitive Science' has 
revolutionized our understanding of mental processes. At the heart 
of this discipline is a central dogma, which plays a role analogous to 
the doctrine of atomism in physics, the germ theory of disease in 
medicine, or plate tectonics in geology. This central dogma is the 
'Computational Theory of Mind': that mental processes are formal 
manipulations of symbols, or programs, consisting of sequences of 
elementary processes made available by the information-processing 
capabilities of neural tissue. The computational theory of mind has 
led to rapid progress because it has given a precise mechanistic 
sense to formally vague terms such as 'memory', 'meaning', 'goal', 
'perception', and the like, which are indispensable to explaining 
intelligence.10 
To be sure, the psychological model-of-the-mind addressed by Gardner 
and other cognitivists is indeed far, far more consonant with the working 
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model provided by computers than any ex cathedra trichotomy of Id, Ego and 
Super Ego, what Gardner calls "the unbridled conjecturing of the 
Freudians. . . .n11 In fact, from a postmodern position, cognitive science is 
likely to be regarded as a consummate foil to Freudianism. Dudley Andrew's 
iris editorial, "Cognitivism: Quests and Questionings," touches this same 
regard: ". . . we are now witnessing American film theory audaciously 
tendering a psychological model, often set explicitly against psychoanalysis, 
labeled cognitive science."12 
For me, cognitivism also provides a way that a film theorist can explain 
an interest beyond Hollywood's entertainment or Cannes' aesthetics. My 
interest in cognitivism helps warrant my fascination with many types of images 
beyond the mechanical-chemical constructs which run through projectors at 24 
frames-per-second. This includes the major similarities and subtle differences 
between film and video. It includes artificial intelligence's seeming inability to 
identify film/video "cuts" (i.e., the articulation of editing). It could also include 
a comparison and contrast between cinematographic constructs and such 
diverse forms as x-rays, xerox copies, images derived from radio telescopy, 
tomography, cartography, Mandelbrot sets in computer graphics, and "Virtual 
Reality"~that contemporary interrelationship of computers, human vision and 
tactility, and interactive video games. This is not to say that I know these 
modes have been studied by cognitivists (artificial intelligence is clearly the 
exception, praised by Gardner as a "quintessentially cognitive discipline"13); it 
is just that cognitive science's broad scope encompasses the range of my 
curiosity for para-cinematographic surrogates of reality, surrogates which have 
been wont to remain outside the realm of classic and contemporary film 
theory. David Bordwell's iris essay, "A Case for Cognitivism," explains 
". . . that in many, perhaps most, respects, film studies is a hermeneutic 
discipline. By and large it is in the business of interpreting texts (mainly, 
films)." 
To this cognitivism offers a sharp challenge. One can argue that a 
powerful theory provides explanations rather than explications. The 
hermeneutic bent of film studies leads to the practice of describing 
texts in an informal metalanguage derived from a theoretical 
doctrine. But a description, even a moving or pyrotechnic one, is 
not an explanation. By contrast, the cognitive framework has a 
signal advantage. It does not tell stories. It is not a hermeneutic 
grid; it cannot be allegorized. Like all theorizing, it asks the 
Kantian question: Given certain properties of a phenomenon, what 
must be the conditions producing them? It then searches for causal, 
functional, or teleological explanations of those conditions.14 
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Further, I see three levels of engagement between film theory and 
cognitive science. First is the meta-theoretical level; that is, articles like 
BordwelTs "Case" which set out to situate cognitivism within, or in contrast to, 
other theoretical methodologies that have already gained acceptance in film 
studies. Second is the use of the vast research-and-publication, which already 
constitutes cognitivist bibliographies, for alternative evidence or support to 
explain enigmatic film phenomena. This seems especially likely for psychology 
where Freudian conjectures are readily replaced by contemporary empirical 
evidence. Third would be the actual discovery of new cognitive/film data by 
researchers schooled in science's empirical and experimental foundations. Of 
the three, the first seems the most common, at this writing, while the third 
begs for exercise and contribution. I think the following essays bear out the 
above generalization. 
Joseph Anderson, however, because he has a background in both film and 
perceptual psychology is the exception to the rule. He is a veritable pioneer 
in amalgamating film studies with cognitive science. In the seventies he taught 
film theory at the University of Wisconsin under the course title "Psychophysics 
and Cinema" where his text was a sheaf of articles winnowed from journals of 
experimental psychology. In 1978, as associate editor of the Journal of the 
University Film Association, I secured an Anderson MS entitled "The Myth of 
Persistence of Vision," which still strikes me as a singular, stunning, watershed 
work.15 Anderson's empirical research in binocular rivalry had made him 
suspicious of the concept "persistence of vision" which had become ubiquitous 
in the literature of film, and that article, written in collaboration with his wife 
Barbara, demonstrated that the concept "persistence of vision" is in fact 
scientifically indefensible and historically inaccurate. Anderson's present 
article, "Between Veridicality and Illusion," is presented as an overview of 
cognitive film theory. I should warn readers not to allow the easy access and 
innovative style, or the appeal of ordinary reason, to lull them into assuming 
that Anderson is saying something ordinary. To the contrary, he goes beyond 
Andre Bazin's ontological question (What is Cinema?) to the very heart of our 
discipline and asks, "What is the power of the motion picture; why do we care?" 
I found his proposals for answering this question exemplary in their sweep 
across the several disciplines of cognitive science. 
David Bordwell is a world-class film scholar who has made major 
contributions to film history, theory and criticism. His books on the Danish 
film director Carl Dryer, the Japanese master Yasujiro Ozu, and the Soviet 
filmmaker/theorist Sergei Eisenstein illustrate his grasp of international 
cinema. And his lectures and writings advocating a cognivist perspective on 
film theory during a period of psychoanalytic/Marxist domination of the field 
of film scholarship demonstrate his courage. He is today clearly one of 
America's foremost film scholars. His present essay, "Cognition and 
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Comprehension: Viewing and Forgetting in Mildred Pierce" builds upon his 
recent theoretical books, Narration in the Fiction Film and Making Meaning}6 
It is an example of my second level of engagement between film theory and 
cognitive science. "Cognition and Comprehension" should prove particularly 
informative for the potential employment of cognitive science in theatre 
analysis because it provides a cognitivist answer to the classic explication de 
texte. But, as BordwelTs own "Case for Cognitivism" explained, the cognitive 
framework is not an hermeneutic grid. In "Cognition and Comprehension" 
Bordwell seeks "causal, functional, or teleological explanations" for issues of 
characterization and plotting in the classic film-noir melodrama, Mildred Pierce. 
Noël Carroll used his set of philosophers' tools to fashion an explosive 
device in the form of a book entitled Mystifying Movies.11 The Shockwaves of 
its 1988 publication are still being felt. In Mystifying Movies Carroll questioned 
the methods and assumptions of the dominant paradigm in film study. When 
Warren Buckland wrote a reactionary review of the book which appeared in 
the film journal Screen, the journal refused to print Carroll's energetic 
rebuttal, "Cognitivism, Contemporary Film Theory and Method: A Response 
to Warren Buckland."18 It is thus printed here, for the first time, where it 
addresses basic methodological issues and serves as an epistolary answer to the 
many questions and concerns which cognitivism seems to raise for its legion 
of scientifically phobic or naive critics. 
Calvin Pryluck offered an insight in 1973 that seemed counterintuitive at 
the time, but now appears prescient. He simply stated that using language as 
a model for understanding film was not a productive pursuit. Almost no one 
heeded him, and the field of film study set out to re-develop a "grammar" of 
film. When that specific effort failed, other attributes of language were 
engaged as exemplars for film analysis. A less tangled path did not readily 
appear, and as Pryluck himself admits, "It took me several years to become 
absolutely convinced that language and film have nothing to do with each other 
as formal systems, except that they are both sign systems." In restrospect, this 
position can be regarded as a kind of nascent film cognitivism. His article 
"When is a Sign Not a Sign" updates his thinking on this issue and reasserts his 
fundamental contention that, "As logical systems language is deductive and film 
is inductive." 
By and large, most of the readers of this supplement likely teach and 
study under the administration of a college of "arts and sciences." What I 
think Ilike most about cognitivism's "promise" for film theory is its potential 
power to re-bond these often disparate categories. Recall that the etymology 
of our term "esthetics" lies in the Greek words aisthetikos (i.e., "perceptive") 
and aisthanesthai (i.e., "to perceive," an investigation today left to perceptual 
psychology). This etymology is clearly retained in our term "anaesthetic." 
Cognitivism can reflect that etymology and provide an extremely heuristic 
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reunification of science and art which should help us awake from the 
anaesthetic sleep bequeathed by too many years of theories insulated from 
even a simple sense of production, and theories built upon political premises 
or obsolete maps of the human mind. 
Lawrence, Kansas 
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